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POST-DISASTER TECHNICAL INFORMATION FLOW 
FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION OF HOUSING
By Everett Ressler
In the last few years, natural disasters in Haiti, Nicaragua, Turkey, 
Iran, Bangladesh, Peru and Guatemala destroyed housing to such an extent 
that massive reconstruction programs were needed. Following each disaster, 
the respective national government, other governments, international agencies, 
local communities and other groups responded by initiating housing programs.
The goal of this paper is to briefly investigate where such programs 
acquired the technical information needed to formulate and implement post­
disaster housing programs, and to explore the need for and possible ways of 
improving this technical information flow.
Methodology
Guatemala was selected as a case study. Personal interview was the means 
of acquiring information about the flow of technical information. Interviews 
were conducted with personnel in housing programs of the Guatemalan Government, 
of official foreign aid, of voluntary agencies, and of religiously-affiliated 
groups. These discussions focused on a description of the housing programs; 
a review of what technical information sources had been used; the rationale 
for the technical decisions made; and what was felt to have been learned.
Findings
On February 4, 1976, a major earthquake in Guatemala destroyed over two 
hundred thousand houses. At least thirty agencies responded by setting up 
housing programs. Of the twenty-four major agencies, six were international 
charities, six were religiously-affiliated, six were representatives of other 
nations ( three governmental and three private), and six were locally-based 
groups.1
There was great diversity between these housing programs, including major 
differences such as the basic approach to housing, structural design, materials 
and methods.  ^ However, the purpose of this paper is not to evaluate these 
differences, but rather to investigate the basis on which such decisions were 
made.
There are many distinct facets to the need for, and use of, technical 
information in post-disaster housing programs. The findings of this study are 
grouped into the following categories: Information Users; Information Use; 
Information Flow; Information Type; and Information Sources.
1 Charlotte Thompson and Paul Thompson, Reconstruction of Housing in Guatemala: 
A Survey of Programs Proposed After the Earthquakes of February, 1976.
2 More specific details of these differences have been outlined in the study 
cited above.
I. Information Users (Program Personnel):
One of the most striking findings was that, generally, neither field nor 
administrative personnel working in the housing programs had technical back 
grounds or experience in housing. The most obvious reason for this was that 
people with experience in administering post-disaster housing programs virtually 
did not exist, so concerned people from other professions altruistically assumed 
the responsibility. In other cases, the selection of non-technical people 
seemed to stem from a misconception of some agencies that post-disaster housing 
is merely shelter which can be constructed in any form by anyone.
With the broad diversity of professions represented in program personnel 
came obviously useful skills, and the diligence with which they worked is 
commendable. The lack of experience in housing, however, highlighted the signi­
ficance and need for technical input.
Program personnel were quick to seek technical advisors, but often en 
countered difficulties in evaluating the highly contradictory technical opinions 
given (these will be discussed in further detail later). The need for such 
technical advisors arises out of the fact that housing is a specialized field. 
Housing programs in a post—disaster situation add many specifically different 
variables, and building in an earthquake-prone area demands still more very 
important considerations.
It should also be pointed out that only a very small percentage of the 
people interviewed had worked previously in a disaster situation or felt they 
might ever work in a disaster situation elsewhere. This indicates the lack 
of collective memory for building reconstruction programs on a base of past 
experience. It is also indicative of the problem of transfering what was 
iQamed in this disaster to people involved in other disaster situations.
II. Pattern of Information Use:
How technical information was used determined the pattern of when the 
information was needed.
A. Program Personnel:
Program administrators, congruent with the responsibility of assessing 
options and determining future programs, particularly sought information 
within the first three weeks after the disaster. This initial period 
was undoubtedly most significant for technical input. It was during 
this three-week period that damage was assessed, options for reconstruction 
programs considered, and in many cases initial program plans finalized 
and building materials ordered. Approximately 75% of the agencies inter­
viewed maintained the program conceived during the first three weeks.
The technical information needed by program administrators in this con 
ceptualization phase concerned options, and how such could be implemented. 
The administrator of a very large program suggested that, immediately^ 
post—disaster, model houses be built exemplifying all different building 
materials and techniques relevant to reconstruction programs, for the
purpose of providing program administrators with visual information upon 
which to base their decisions. Another form of this was the housing fair 
which was held in the capital city, consisting of the display of proto­
types of manufactured houses. Although these houses were not considered 
appropriate or economical for rural reconstruction programs, the fair 
itself (and the former suggestion) was a response to the need expressed 
by program administrators for information about options.
It was during the initial three-week conceptual phase that the lessons 
learned and carried forward from past experience were most useful. The 
removal or burial, by large earth-moving equipment, of post-earthquake 
rubble in Nicaragua was several times mentioned as both destructive and 
wasteful of valuable resources. With at least one known agency, the 
information from the Nicaraguan experience was the deterrent to the use 
of large equipment in that way in Guatemala, thereby preventing a repeat 
of the same mistake.
Program administrators relied most heavily upon consultants and technical 
advisors also during this initial three-week period. Consultants and 
technical advisors, exploring options and alternatives for program plan­
ning, particularly sought information during the second and third weeks. 
Their greatest need was for information which was technical in nature.
The U.S. Embassy, viewed as a primary source of information, reported 
that the greatest volume of requests were received within this initial 
period and came predominantly from Guatemalan professionals seeking 
information about a specific problem. Examples include requests for 
information about the stabilization of adobe and about building with 
ferrocement.
Field personnel directly involved in the building process viewed the need 
for technical information differently, from the perspective of functional 
problems. The technical information which they felt was needed was 
pragmatic, in a nhow-to-buildn form, and directly related to actual con­
struction problems and difficulties encountered in carrying out the 
building program. In other words, they considered technical information 
as a functional resource needed for the duration of the program. Short­
term technical consultations were very unacceptable. Field personnel 
felt the need was for a readily available technical resource person who 
would assist with the specific problems at hand, as they came up.
It should also be noted that the demands of the post-disaster situation 
were such that answers to technical questions were demanded almost as 
soon as the problem was recognized. Time delays were just not acceptable 
to personnel, administrative or field.
B. Technical Resource People (Consultants):
For both program administrators and field personnel, technical resource 
people were an important part of the technical information flow. They 
were generally architects and engineers, or students in those fields. 
They came from local technical firms, the university, from sponsoring 
agencies, from international consulting firms, as official aid represen­
tatives, and as independent individuals.
However, almost without exception, personnel at every level of the 
housing programs mentioned the confusion caused by differing technical 
recommendations. Consultants tended to work very autonomously. The 
only known, functional, interagency technical information sharing 
occurred during the first six weeks, through a weekly meeting of field 
level personnel which was sponsored by INTERTECT. The only interagency 
sharing of technical information at an administrative level occurred at 
the instigation of the National Reconstruction Committee, nine months 
after the disaster.
Although many of the consultants were respected professionals, very few 
had any experience in the mass production of housing in rural settings. 
Consultants often made recommendations based on their past experiences 
in large, urban areas or other cultural settings. Many examples were 
given of architectural designs for houses in western style, without 
consideration of culturally acceptable cooking facilities, or of siting 
and appearance preferences. The two most common problems were: the 
design of houses which were simply not within the economic range of the 
people, and consequently not appropriate; and the design of houses with­
out regard to earthquake resistant building principles.
Whether the consultants were local engineers, architects, university 
professors or international consultants, both administrative and field 
personnel concluded that useful consultants must be "functionalM; that 
is, that they not only provide information on a "how-to" level, but also 
provide information congruent with the social and cultural values of the 
community. It was this ability to interpolate purely technical informa­
tion into the community setting which was felt to be most lacking and 
was most demanded of the consultant.
The system for selecting consultants was very informal. Program admin­
istrators preferred a consultant from within their organization, and 
they'"usually chose a consultant with whom they were personally acquainted. 
However, over \ of the agencies interviewed had changed consultants —  
and basic elements of their housing programs —  within the first several 
months.
The most frequently received suggestion for ways to improve technical 
information delivery was the development of a roster of available con­
sultants with experience in post-disaster housing, who can work effectively 
at a functional level. Experience was the most sought-after qualification.
III. Information Type and Sources (Printed):
The technical information most sought-after following the disaster was 
data concerning earthquakes; local building methods; how local building 
materials could be used in different ways; reports of experience in other 
areas, building with similar materials; and information about suitable and 
available options.
Within the first three weeks, the following materials are known to have 
been brought into Guatemala, reproduced, and distributed widely among agencies
--  Design, Siting, and Construction of Low-Cost Housing
and Community Buildings to Better Withstand Earthquakes 
and Windstorms was distributed by U.S.AID;
--  Small Buildings in Earthquake Areas was distributed by
CARITAS and INTERTECT;
--  Manual for the Construction of Houses with Adobe (from
Peru) was distributed by U.S. AID and the National 
Emergency Committee;
--  Tu Puedes Reparar Tu Vivienda (from Mexico) was distri­
buted by the Mexican Embassy, the National Emergency 
Committee, and through the four national newspapers;
--  Earthquakes and Small Structures was distributed by
CARITAS and OXFAM. . .
OXFAM was the only organization which began producing other printed 
materials for reconstruction within the first three weeks, the emergency 
phase. However, the following materials are known to have been developed with 
in the first three months:
--  OXFAM, World Neighbors, and Save the Children Alliance
produced over 100,000 copies of different construction 
manuals and teaching aids as supplements for training 
programs for builders;
--  CARITAS produced handouts on emergency shelter and the
repair of damaged houses, and a manual for building with 
local materials;
--  CARE produced a manual on how to build an earthquake-
resistant house;
--  The National Emergency Committee, with Educacion Basica
Rural, produced a series of nine leaflets on how to 
demolish, salvage and repair houses;
--  CEMAT compiled a manual on the techniques of building with
local materials in an earthquake zone;
--  An independent group of architects designed a small manual
on building techniques;
--  Save the Children Alliance produced a series of leaflets
on the repair and reinforcement of damaged houses.
Besides these general materials, each agency which designed a house 
produced materials describing that particular house. With the major exception 
of the materials developed by OXFAM, World Neighbors and Save the Children 
Alliance, much of the above listed materials were predominantly translations 
and adaptations of the five sets of materials brought in immediately after the 
disaster. This fact underlines the significance of the information which is 
distributed. The five original materials brought into Guatemala were general 
topic papers. Agency personnel needed to have the technical competence to 
extract, evaluate and interpolate this general information into specific 
recommendations for local materials and building practices.
The importance of the ability to analyze technical information was 
especially noted with the Manual for the Construction of Houses with Adobe.
This was circulated widely; however, it was reportedly written by a non­
technician and contains sketches of building techniques which structural 
engineers consider incorrect.
A. Technical Information:
In spite of the rather significant amount of printed materials produced, 
the personnel interviewed verbalized a lack of technical information. A 
common example was the confusion concerning the broadly differing opinions 
on the structural analysis of why adobe houses were destroyed. Was it 
because adobe is inherently weak? Or was it the way adobe was used as a 
building material? And should adobe be used in reconstruction? The 
decision of many groups to use a different building material such as 
concrete block, stemmed more from a lack of information about adobe and 
anti—seismic structures than from a sound comparison of the different 
materials. Similar confusion centered on how to add a porch to a house 
while retaining the seismic—resistant integrity of the house.
These examples illustrate that, although some printed information was 
available and consultants existed with every program, practically~ 
speaking, there was a lack of knowledge about some very basic consider­
ations of the situation.
Other examples of necessary technical information included: wood pre­
servative alternatives; building code information (relevant to the local 
situation); information on the repair of damaged adobe structures; design 
recommendations for footings, wall thickness and roofing materials; ferro— 
cement; reinforcing for concrete; stabilization of adobe; and alternative 
building materials. At the time of the disaster, these information 
materials were not known to have existed in Guatemala.
B. Program Information:
Each program also had to determine an approach to housing, a method of 
construction, a technology of building, a speed for construction, siting 
considerations, building materials, cultural suitability, costs and dis­
tribution. Each of these categories in turn included many individual 
considerations such as whether the program should provide housing for the 
people or enable people to provide housing for themselves; whether to
build temporary or permanent structures; whether building materials 
should be salvaged from the ruins, local building materials and techniques 
used, or whether building materials should be imported. Should the houses 
be sold or given without cost? Should a pre-designed house be offered or 
individual preferences be permitted? And again, one of the most important 
considerations in such an earthquake-prone area was whether the houses 
being built were structurally sound.
All of these considerations demanded a technical input integrated with 
non-technical factors. Past experience from other reconstruction programs 
may have been very useful in the determination of each variable. However, 
both administrators and field personnel always qualified the need for 
information by saying that the need was not simply for the purely technical 
information. It was felt that technical information was closely linked 
with social and cultural factors and must be understood from the perspective 
of the specific field situation. Seldom, if ever, was there a need for 
technical information about how to build an earthquake-resistant house 
independent of such considerations as what the owner wanted the house to 
look like; what materials the owner wanted to use in building his house; 
what building materials were available; how the living space was to be 
used; whether the house would be enlarged; and how the house was to be 
paid for. Examples include the lack of occupancy of emergency shelters 
which were considered unsatisfactory, and the refusal to adopt the technique 
of building with buttresses because it did not conform with the desired 
house appearance.
Just as technical information cannot be divorced from sociological con­
siderations iii the local community, neither can technical information be 
effectively utilized without close involvement with the personnel imple­
menting the program. Interviews with field personnel repeatedly revealed 
that coupled with any technical information came an equally great need 
for program information. This included planning, program design, training, 
logistics, personnel, and information for the many specific difficulties 
of the daily operations. Technical consultants were often heavily de­
pended upon for combining technical data with program information.
Conclusions
Technical information must be recognized as a specific and unique com­
ponent of reconstruction programs. The assumption that the technical informa­
tion required is simple and readily available has not been proven true by 
experience, particularly if post-disaster housing is viewed from a develop­
mental perspective.
Improvement in the post—disaster flow of technical information must begin 
with the understanding that the information-sharing systems which operate in 
normal times do not meet the need. Not only is the disaster situation atypical, 
but the people requesting the information, the way the information is used, 
the time constraints, and the specific information required are all unique.
Technical information from a program perspective must be understood in 
a fragmented way:
A. Program Conception: Personnel who initiate post—disaster housing
programs have a distinct use of technical information, for which they 
depend on technical resource people. The information will be needed 
immediately following a disaster for a relatively short period of time.
It must include data relevant to all the factors pertaining to program 
implementation, including past experience.
B. Technical Design: Technical resource people involved as consultants
to any program will seek technical information in exploring options for 
specific problems. The people performing this function are the most 
likely to contact universities, international sources, etc.
C. Functional Problems: Technical resource people are specifically
needed to relate to the program implementation process. The information 
required is typically not highly technical data per se, but topical 
materials describing the processes.
But the effectiveness of every program increases with the orientation of 
sharing experience and evaluating new options.
Recommendations
I. Coordination:
The broad coordination of disaster programs has almost become standard 
procedure; so must the coordination of technical information. Immediately 
post-disaster, a center for technical information should be set up, and the 
following goals included:
A. Its primary goal should be to work in response to the needs of 
participating agency personnel;
B. It should function as an interagency forum where ideas and lessons 
learned can be shared;
C. It should serve as a technical back-up by channeling requests to 
the resource people available;
D. It should serve as a data bank, drawing in pertinent information 
and disseminating it as requested;
E. It must be set up with the active involvement of all housing pro­
grams and resource people.
II. Pre-Disaster Planning:
The official governments, international agencies and local groups which 
exist in disaster-prone areas must begin with pre-disaster planning. This
must include not simply preparation for a response to the emergency phase, but 
also analysis and planning for positive programming in reconstruction. This 
preparation must focus on the variables, study the options, and collect infor­
mation from what others have learned.
Pre-disaster planning begins with the objective evaluation of what has 
been learned in past experience; such evaluation should be a regularly scheduled 
part of every reconstruction program. This is especially important because of 
the short duration of reconstruction programs —  the people involved move on, 
and the lessons learned may be lost.
III. Data Bank:
There is an obvious need for an international data collection and dis­
semination center specifically oriented to technical information of use in 
post-disaster situations. The purpose must be to collect pertinent technical 
information and corresponding program information. Such a center must have 
the ability to furnish such information immediately in usable form.
The best use of such a data bank would include linkages to an in-country 
pre-disaster planning office or a post-disaster technical coordination unit. 
Suggestions for the provision of such a service have included the United Nations 
Disaster Relief Office, a university, or an independent technical resource 
service.
IV. Consultants:
Past experience in similar situations was one of the most common quali­
fications desired of consultants by agency personnel. It was recommended by 
several agencies that a roster of resource persons with experience and 
expertise be developed. With a better understanding of the needs, agencies 
may be able to provide better consultants.
V. Training:
The goal of every country is to be independent. Training indigenous 
personnel should be one of the key orientations for all consultants.
Post-disaster housing and the technical information provided must be 
oriented to providing houses from the perspective of community development 
rather than from that of temporary emergency response.
